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Deriving History from Law :  
Are Cheques Traceable to the Talmud ? 
 
Benjamin GEVA1 
 
(Osgoode Hall Law School York University, Toronto) 
 
1. Introduction 
Eminent historians single out the Talmud2 as being a unique legal 
text in Antiquity providing for a framework facilitating at least a 
                                                       
1 LL. B, Heb. U of Jerusalem; LL. M, SJD, Harvard; Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall 
Law School of York University, Toronto. This paper is part of a study on the legal 
history of the payment order for which funding has been provided by a Major 
Research Grant awarded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada (SSHRCC), whose support I acknowledge with gratitude. Elie Zolty of the 
2007 Osgoode graduating class provided invaluable research assistance beyond the 
call of duty; I acknowledge with gratitude his thorough and meticulous research as 
well as ongoing feedback. For research assistance at the final stage I am obliged to 
both Joseph Salmon and Joseph Juda respectively of the 2009 and 2010 Osgoode 
graduating classes. All errors are mine. 
2 The Talmud is the summary of the oral law that evolved after centuries of post-
biblical scholarly effort by the Jewish sages who lived in Eretz-Yisrael (Palestine, 
being biblical Canaan, or Judea as it was until shortly after the turn of the Common 
Era (CE)) and Babylonia (being present-day Iraq). It has two complementary 
components; the Mishna, a book of law, and the extensive commentary, in the form 
of an edited record of the discussions in the academies, known as Gemara. In 
principle, each Mishnaic law is followed by the corresponding Gemara commentary, 
so that both form the Talmudic text on a given point. The compilation of the Mishna 
was completed in Eretz-Yisrael around 200 CE. There are two versions for the 
Gemara, between which the one whose compilation was completed in Babylonia in 
the fifth century CE (‘Talmud Bavli’) is the more authoritative one. The compilation 
of the other version, known as the Jerusalem Talmud (‘Talmud Yerushalmi’) was 
completed in Eretz-Yisrael in the fourth century CE. For an introduction, see e.g. 
A.STEINSALTZ, The Talmud-The Steinsaltz Edition - A Reference Guide, New York 
1989. According to A.STEINSALTZ, The Essential Talmud, New York 1976, p.3: « If 
the Bible is the cornerstone of Judaism, then the Talmud is its central pillar ». Other 
than indicated otherwise, the ensuing discussion is on the basis of the Hebrew-
Aramaic original text of the Talmud Bavli. English translation and comprehensive 
commentary is published by Mesorah Publications Limited, the Artscroll 
Series/Schottenstein Edition. Unless specifically indicated otherwise, all Jewish law 
sources cited and discussed in this chapter are in Hebrew. 
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limited cheque system3. However, the Talmud does not provide for 
adequate legal infrastructure for banking to develop; it prohibits the 
taking of interest on loans4, and further inhibits on the lending out of 
deposits5. Banking is premised on lending for profit out of bank 
deposits, and it is against the background of a thriving banking system 
that one expects the development of a cheque, or in fact any non-cash 
payment system6. Hence, the existence of a Talmudic cheque system 
is counter-intuitive.  
Certainly, a plain reading of a relevant Talmudic text may point 
out to the possible existence of a cheque system. Nevertheless, a 
rigorous analysis of this text, supported by traditional scholarly 
                                                       
3 See e.g. R.BOGAERT, Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques, Leyde 1968, 
p.340-341, fn.206, p.413, fn.7, and BOGAERT’S speech in a conference session 
reproduced in (1977), 123 Reuve belge de numismatique et de sigillographie 265, 
where he speaks of the cheque under the Talmud as an instrument of payment to 
workers who according to Mosaic laws are to receive daily their wages. To a similar 
effect see also J.ANDREAU, La vie financière dans le monde romain: les métiers de 
manieurs d’argent, Rome 1987, p.562, J.ANDREAU, Banking and Business in the 
Roman World, Cambridge 1999, [translated to English by J.LLOYD] p.42: « the use of 
cheques is attested … in Canaan, following rulings made by Mosaic laws on the 
payment of wages ». See also E.ASHTOR, “Banking Instruments Between the Muslim 
East and the Christian West” (1972), in East-West Trade in the Medieval 
Mediterranean, BZ.KEDAR (ed.) London: Variorum Reprints, 1986, 553, at p.555.  
4 Prohibition is based on three biblical cites and exists for any transaction where a 
party is obligated to deliver or pay in genre. These biblical verses are Exodus 22:24, 
Leviticus 25:36-7, and Deuteronomy 23:20. R.BOGAERT, Les Origines antiques de la 
banque de dépôt, Leyde 1966, p.157 acknowledges this factor as one that militated 
against the development of banking among the Jews in Judea during the period under 
discussion. 
5 The principal text is Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.43A et seq. It gives the moneychanger 
a limited right to use money deposited for safekeeping in an open bag but not to mix 
the entire deposit with others. See B.GEVA, Bank Collections and Payment 
Transactions: Comparative Study of Legal Aspects, Oxford 2001, p.67-71. Certainly, 
if so agreed, and for a fee, the moneychanger could invest money deposited with him, 
either for a depositor, or even under a joint venture with him, though in the latter 
case, only under a mutual profit and loss sharing agreement. See Talmud, Bava 
Metzia, pp.68a and 104b.  
6 For the link among these three activities, namely, deposit-taking, lending and the 
provision of payment services as underlying the origin of banking in Ancient Greece, 
see: BOGAERT, Les Origines antiques de la banque de dépôt , supra n.4, p.137 -144: 
To these days, « To be recognized as a bank … an institution is expected to receive 
deposits of money from its customers; to maintain current accounts for them; to 
provide advances in the form of loans or overdrafts; and to manage payments on 
behalf of its customers … »  E.GREEN, Banking — An Illustrated History, New 
York 1989, p.11. 
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commentaries, leads to a contrary conclusion. Based on a study of the 
text and commentary, the present study makes the following 
arguments:  
1. While written legal documents are recognized by the Talmud,7 
there is no indication supporting the existence of written cheques; at 
the most, the alleged cheque system was oral. True, a cheque need not 
necessarily be circulating which would have required writing, and yet, 
lack of embodiment in paper is inconsistent with standardization 
required for a ‘system’ to exist8. 
2. While a cheque may be drawn against a line of credit, a cheque 
system is typically associated with funds kept with depositaries, 
which are withdrawn by cheque9. However, the Talmudic discussion 
on the closest scenario to a cheque system is taken to relate to a 
situation in which the paymaster extends credit to the debtor;  
3. Presence of all three may be required for the renunciation of 
recourse by a creditor against the debtor to whom a paymaster extends 
credit. Presence of all three is however ill-fit to accommodate the 
cheque mechanism, under which a cheque is issued by the debtor to 
the creditor, and subsequently presented by the creditor to the 
paymaster, without all three present at the same time in the same 
place; and  
                                                       
7 See e.g. Talmud, Kiddushin, p.47B-48A (documentary debt) and Talmud, Bava 
Kamma p.70A (the urcheta, being a written and properly witnessed authorization 
given by a creditor to an emissary, turning him into an agent with the power to collect 
from the creditor’s debtor money or chattel owed by that debtor to his creditor) 
8 Contrast with the system for non-circulating and yet written cheques in Greco-
Roman Egypt set out in R.S.BAGNALL and R.BOGAERT, Orders for Payment from a 
Banker’s Archive: Papyri in the Collection of Florida State University (1975), in 
R.BOGAERT, Trapezitica Aegyptiaca. Recueil de recherches sur la banque en Égypte 
Gréco-Romaine, Firenze 1994, 219 at p.239, R.BOGAERT, Note sur l’emploi du 
chéque dans l’Égypte ptolémaïque” (1983), in Trapezitica ibid. at p.245, R.BOGAERT, 
Recherches sue la banque en Égypte Gréco-Romaine (1987-89), in Trapezitica ibid. 1 
at p.23, R.BOGAERT, Les opérations des banques de l’ Égypte Ptolémaïque (1998), 29 
Ancient Society 45, p.141.  
9 In modern law the point is acknowledged in e.g. Article 3 of the Uniform Law on 
Cheques (adopted on March 11, 1931 by the Second Geneva Convention on Bills of 
Exchange) effectively providing that a cheque is usually: « drawn on a banker 
holding funds at the disposal of the drawer… »  
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4. The law that evolved in the Talmud to govern the situation under 
discussion is inadequate to provide for a comprehensive satisfactory 
scheme covering cheques, which would be atypical in light of the 
thorough and meticulous analysis of the relevant scenario. 
The main part of the article is an in-depth analysis of the Talmudic 
passage and related Commentaries from which the existence of the 
cheque is said to derive. The article develops the above-mentioned 
arguments and concludes against the existence of cheques and a 
cheque system under the Talmud.  
 
2. Directing a Creditor to a Paymaster: the Bava Metzia Text 
a. The Talmudic Text in Bava Metzia: Credit Extended by Paymaster 
Biblical law requires an employer to pay wages that are due to a 
worker for labour on the day services were rendered10. In Bava 
Metzia, the Mishna presents some qualifications to the prohibition 
against delaying payment, one of which is the case where the 
employer directed the worker to receive payment from a storekeeper 
or moneychanger11. On this passage the Gemara asks whether the 
worker has recourse against the employer or not. One sage, Rav 
Shesheth would not allow the recourse, while another sage, Rabbah, 
would permit it12. 
For lack of discussion on the points, it is safe to assume that 
neither a pre-existing master agreement nor writing is required. Rashi 
says that the scenario dealt with by the Mishna is that of an employer 
directing to the storekeeper a worker who needs to purchase 
provisions, and in which the employer instructs the storekeeper to sell 
                                                       
10 Leviticus 19:13. The Mishna, in Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.111A, applies this same-
day payment requirement also to the rental payment due from a hirer to an owner of a 
rented animal or utensils, so that the discussion below equally applies to the recourse 
from the hirer by an owner of a rented animal or utensils who is to be paid by a 
storekeeper or moneychanger.  
11 Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.111A. 
12 Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A.  Both sages endeavour to rationalize their positions 
on the Mishanic text itself. Thus, Rabbah asserts that in merely stating that the 
employer is released from the transgression of the prohibition against withholding 
payment, the Mishna is telling us that the employer is not released from the 
responsibility to pay the worker. Conversely, Rav Shesheth asserts that in stating that 
the employer is released from the transgression of the prohibition against withholding 
payment, the Mishna is telling us that the employer no longer has any financial 
obligation whatsoever. 
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the provisions to the worker, against the employer’s payment (or 
reimbursement) obligation. In this setting, the storekeeper does not 
pay to the worker any amount previously deposited with him or 
otherwise owed by him to the employer; rather he extends credit to 
the employer.  
On the setting involving the moneychanger, Rashi is more 
equivocal; he states that the employer instructs the moneychanger to 
give the employer small-value coins for one large-value coin. This 
sounds like a change transaction; presumably the employer is to pay a 
large-value coin against the payment of wages to few workers, each 
receiving his own wages in small-value coins. This could be 
consistent with a simultaneous exchange in a money-change 
transaction, as well as with an advance payment by the employer to 
the moneychanger, or even with a deposit held by the moneychanger 
for the employer, out of which payment to the worker is to be made. It 
could however be equally consistent with the situation in which the 
employer is to pay the large-value coin to the moneychanger at a later 
date, which is not different from the employer’s obligation to pay the 
storekeeper for the provisions sold to the worker. It is the symmetry 
between the position of the storekeeper and moneychanger which 
supports the conclusion that the moneychanger ought to be treated as 
positioned in the same situation of the storekeeper, so as to be 
regarded as extending credit. 
Under the picture depicted by Rashi, credit is extended by either 
the storekeeper or moneychanger in the form of actual payment, 
whether in kind or in money, and not in a form of a guaranty 
supporting the employer’s undertaking to make such payment in the 
future. It is in this sense that the storekeeper or moneychanger acts in 
the Bava Metzia text as a paymaster and not surety. 
Commentators made no distinction between scenarios involving a 
storekeeper or a moneychanger, and are taken to refer to both even 
when they mention one only; in the present discussion, “paymaster” is 
thus used to refer to either a storekeeper or moneychanger. 
Furthermore, the credit extension interpretation has not been 
challenged by commentators13. Indeed, the position of the storekeeper 
                                                       
13 By “commentators”, I mean ‘authoritative commentators’ according to whom 
authorized ruling is promulgated in Jewish law. For a dissenting modern scholarly 
view on the point, drawn from historical parallels, see S.ALBECK, The Assignment of 
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as extending credit14, particularly in selling provisions against 
deferred payment obligations15, is mentioned elsewhere in the 
Talmud. In turn, the position of the moneychanger who regularly 
deals in money matters16, as also acting as a moneylender, is more 
obvious; elsewhere the Gemara refers to the employer who borrows 
from a moneychanger to pay the wages of his workers in the 
marketplace17. Presumably, in our scenario, by having the 
disbursement of the loan directly made to the worker, rather than to 
the employer who will then pay the worker, the employer may have 
saved on administration, at least by bypassing the need to deal with 
small-value coins to be paid to numerous workers18.  
The conclusion that the paymaster extends credit to the employer 
may be supported by viewing the Bava Metzia narrative as limited to 
a situation where all three are required to be present together19. This is 
so since in Gitin, the Gemara discusses the legal implications of an 
instruction directed to a person who owes money to the instruction 
giver, to make payment to a third person; in such a case, presence-of-
all-three in one place is specifically required20. This would cover the 
case of the employer who directs a storekeeper or moneychanger who 
owes money to him to make payment to the employer’s worker.  
Hence, where presence of all three is required, a separate discussion 
may be needed only for the case of the employer who directs his 
                                                                                                                     
Debt in the Talmud (1957), 26 Tarbiz 262, p.274-277 [in Hebrew], where he 
specifically rejects the view of the early commentators (p.277, fn.39) and argues that 
the scenario in the Bava Metzia narrative is in which the paymaster is instructed to 
pay out of the employer’s deposit kept with him. Among the more recent 
commentators, cf. TUR, Choshen Mishpat, Section 339, where the scenario is 
described as one that even covers the case where paymaster owes nothing to the 
employer. ALBECK’S position is further dealt with in infra n.21, n.23 and n.39.  
14 See e.g. a general reference in Talmud, Kiddushin, p.40A.  
15 See e.g. discussion on the storekeeper concerning his ledger, Talmud, Shevuot, 
p.45A and the Jerusalem Talmud, Shevuot, p.36B (further dealt with in §2.e below), 
where nevertheless the storekeeper ‘s books are not accorded great credibility. 
Particularly see PNEI MOSHE on the Gemara in the Jerusalem Talmud above-
captioned page. 
16 See in general, A.GULAK, The Moneychanger's Business According to Talmudic 
Law (1931), 2 Tarbitz, p.154 [in Hebrew]. 
17 Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.46A. 
18 See second paragraph above the one containing n.13 above. 
19 On this point, see RIF on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.68A (of Rif’s page numbering). 
20 Talmud, Gitin, p.13B. 
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worker to receive payment from a storekeeper or moneychanger who 
does not owe money to him.  
Obviously however, this does not prove the reverse, namely, that 
presence-of-all-three is required in the Bava Metzia setting. It could 
well be, indeed, that the consensus on viewing the paymaster as 
extending of credit to the employer21 is not premised on a requirement 
as to the presence of all three; rather it derives from an understanding 
of the economic background. As indicated in the paragraph that 
follows, support to the conclusion that as depositaries of money, who 
owed money to their depositors, neither the moneychanger nor the 
storekeeper acted as paymasters, may come from elsewhere in the 
Talmud.  
Certainly, the moneychanger was in the business of taking deposits 
of money, and perhaps the storekeeper followed suit22. Yet, there is no 
indication as to the economic function of the depositary as a 
paymaster23. Indeed, an important observation can be made with 
                                                       
21 A modern departure from this consensus is by ALBECK, The Assignment of Debt in 
the Talmud, supra n.13. He assumes that the presence of all three is not required in 
the Bava Metzia narrative, but nevertheless argues that this text is concerned with the 
case where the paymaster owes the money to the employer. ALBECK distinguishes 
between the Bava Metzia scenario and the one in Gitin (see particularly ibid. p.276, 
fn.38), by saying that the former is concerned with a payment order, rather than the 
transfer of a debt owed by the paymaster, which is the concern in Gitin. In ALBECK’S 
view, in the Bava Metzia setting, upon assuming the employer’s obligation to pay the 
worker his wages, the paymaster became subject to the requirement not to delay 
payment to the worker, and could not discharge himself by merely transferring to the 
worker the debt he (the paymaster) owes to the employer. But as will be seen infra 
n.39, there is a difficulty in theorizing the paymaster’s liability to the worker, where 
the paymaster owed money to the employer. Nor does ALBECK explain lack of 
immediate payment by the paymaster (who allegedly owes funds to the employer) or 
why the worker’s consent to the alleged debt transfer does not excuse the prompt 
payment obligation, all of which is addressed in §2.e below (which further supports 
the presence-of-all-three requirement).  
22 See Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.43A, discussed in §2.a above, where it is disputed as 
to whether in terms of his permission to deal with deposited money and his 
responsibility for its loss the storekeeper’s position is that of the moneychanger or of 
a regular depositary. According to GULAK, The Moneychanger's Business According 
to Talmudic Law, supra n.16, p.159, it may well be that moneychangers operated only 
in large cities so that it was common for storekeepers to act as moneychangers in the 
villages. This view can be drawn, for example, from Rava in Talmud, Bava Metzia, 
p.52B. 
23 With respect, I do not think sources put forward by GULAK, The Moneychanger's 
Business According to Talmudic Law, supra n.16, p.158-159 and ALBECK, The 
Assignment of Debt in the Talmud, supra n.13, p.276-277, support their conclusions 
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regard to the abovementioned discussion in Gitin24, on the impact of 
an instruction given to a person who owes money to the instruction 
giver, to pay to a third party. The discussion is in general terms.  It 
refers to the three individuals anonymously, as “Reuven, Shimon, and 
Levi”; it does not characterize them as employer, moneychanger or 
storekeeper, and worker, as in the scenario under discussion in Bava 
Metiza. Stated otherwise, in Gitin, the Gemara declines to refer to the 
depositary-paymaster as a moneychanger or storekeeper; rather it 
treats the depositary-paymaster as an anonymous “Shimon.” Thereby, 
it possibly tells us that as a paymaster, the moneychanger or 
storekeeper must have been taken to act as a credit extender and not a 
debtor to the instruction giver. 
In the final analysis, no firm conclusions can be drawn from the 
plain Bava Metiza text which is quite equivocal as to whether it is 
envisaged that all three must be present. True, in his commentary, 
Rashi speaks of the employer as ‘cutting off the worker from him and 
making him stand with the storekeeper25’; there is no indication in 
Rashi’s description of the employer physically joining the worker and 
the paymaster, so that all three are present together. Yet, this 
interpretation is inconclusive; Rashi may use his words 
metaphorically and simply refer to the employer’s intention to severe 
the legal tie between him and the worker, and have it replaced by a 
new direct legal relationship between the paymaster and the worker.  
A cheque may be drawn on a line of credit, though typically it is 
drawn on funds on deposit26. Even if tracing the early cheque to a 
mechanism premised on the extension of credit is not fatal to 
characterizing the mechanism as a cheque, it does not lend support to 
this characterization. At the same time, presence of all three is 
certainly inconsistent with the cheque transaction flow, under which a 
cheque is issued by the debtor to the creditor and subsequently 
presented to payment by the creditor to the paymaster not in the 
presence of the debtor. Indeed, inasmuch as it specifically requires 
                                                                                                                     
to the contrary. Commentators cited throughout this Section have been of the view 
that relevant sources deal with moneychanger or storekeeper extending credit and not 
owing money to the employer.  
24 Supra n.20. 
25 Or in Hebrew, in English transliteration, ‘Nitko me-ezlo ve-he-emidahu ezel 
chenvany’. 
26 See supra n.9. 
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presence of all three, the Gitin passage has not been viewed as dealing 
with a cheque. Discussion on whether all three are required to be 
present in the Bava Metzia passage is thus central to the thesis of this 
article; discussion on the point will however be deferred to §2.e 
below, when the legal underpinning of the disputation between Rav 
Shesheth and Rabbah as well as other aspects of the factual scenario 
are clarified. 
b. Tosafot’s Commentary – Renunciation of Recourse 
Commentators’ analysis evolves around the effectiveness of the 
renunciation of the worker (creditor) against the employer (debtor) so 
as to discharge the employer and not allow recourse by the worker 
against him. Two principal issues are addressed. The first is whether 
recourse is available also prior to, and irrespective of, the paymaster’s 
default in payment. The second is the scope of the renunciation; here 
the discussion focuses on whether effective renunciation is 
conditional or absolute, whether it is express or implied, and whether 
its effectiveness depends on the paymaster’s own obligation to pay. 
As well, discussion evolves around various variations of the basic 
‘incomplete’ scenario in our text.  
Tosafot’s commentary to the Gemara in Bava Metiza27 contains a 
most comprehensive discussion on the recourse issue. It is clear to 
Tosafot that any impact on the worker’s recourse against the employer 
stems from the worker’s consent to abide by the direction, or more 
specifically, from the renunciation embodied in this consent. The 
starting point of Tosafot is that the employer is liable to the worker to 
pay the latter’s wages. The issue then is not recourse, which is 
obviously available to the worker against the party liable to him; 
rather, the issue is that of discharge, or loss of recourse, on the basis 
of the worker’s renunciation. Hence, it is the scope of the 
renunciation, and its effect to generate either an absolute or 
conditional discharge, which preoccupies Tosafot’s discussion.  
It is clear to Tosafot that no disputation could arise where 
renunciation is accompanied by an act of kinyan, (meaning a 
proprietary act). In such case, according to Tosafot, even Rabbah 
would agree that renunciation is effective to generate a discharge so 
that recourse has been lost. This is so under the general rule providing 
for the enforceability of agreements for which the serious intention 
                                                       
27 Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A. 
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has been manifested by an act of kinyan28. Moreover, in Tosafot’s 
view, there is no disputation as to the effectiveness of a renunciation 
unaccompanied by an act of kinyan29, except that in such a case its 
scope and requirements have to be more carefully scrutinized. That is, 
on its own, and without any express words accompanying it, an act of 
kinyan would affect an absolute discharge30; at the same time, a ‘bare’ 
renunciation, unaccompanied by an act of kinyan, requires support, in 
language, circumstances, or both, to ascertain its validity and scope31.  
Against this background, Tosafot first endeavours to determine the 
exact fact situation with respect to which the Gemara discussion takes 
place. He starts by ruling out two settings, in which the answer, 
according to him, ought to be obvious, and hence not to give rise to 
any disputation. These are to be referred to below as Tosafot’s two 
‘obvious’ settings32. The first setting is where the worker, in agreeing 
to be paid by the paymaster, explicitly releases the employer, even in 
the case the paymaster will not pay. This is a case of an unqualified 
renunciation, unequivocally stated. The second setting is that of a 
limited renunciation, namely, when the worker, in agreeing to be paid 
by the paymaster, explicitly makes the release or discharge of the 
employer contingent or conditional on, actual payment by the 
paymaster. In Tosafot’s view, it is obvious that recourse is not 
available to the worker in the first setting, that of an express absolute 
release of the employer by the worker; it is however equally obvious 
according to him that recourse is available, upon the default of the 
paymaster, in the second setting, that of an express conditional release 
                                                       
28 “Kinyan” literally means property or acquisition.  In Jewish law, as a Halakhic 
concept, an act of kinyan is a formal procedure to render an agreement legally 
binding. Acts of kinyan include pulling, transferring, controlling, lifting or 
exchanging an article.   See in general: STEINSALTZ, The Talmud: A Reference Guide, 
supra n.1, p.254. For a proprietary act for the transfer of ownership see: Talmud, 
Kiddushin, pp.22B, 25B-26A and Bava Batra, p.84B. 
29 Which is in line with Talmud, Kiddushin, p.16A, cited by TOSAFOT in Talmud, 
Bava Metzia, p.112A. Hereafter, “TOSAFOT” is to mean Tosafot’s editor. 
30 Ibid. 
31 To that end, an act of kinyan serves as an indication to the firm resolution, without 
which an undertaking is not binding and is revocable; in the absence of such an act, 
the firm resolution is to be evidenced by other extrinsic circumstances. Cf. S.ALBECK, 
The Law of Property and Contract in the Talmud, Jerusalem 1976, 1983, p.114-115 
[in Hebrew]. The binding effect of a promise is the theme of B.LIFSHITZ, Promise: 
Obligation and Acquisition in Jewish Law, Jerusalem 1988 [in Hebrew]. 
32 TOSAFOT, D’H Chozer, commenting on Talmud, Bava Metzia p.112A. 
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of the employer by the worker. In connection with both ‘obvious’ 
settings, the existence or absence of recourse is made dependent on 
the express terms of the worker’s agreement to be paid by the 
paymaster. 
Accepting the premise of a scenario involving the extension of 
credit by the paymaster to the employer, and adhering to his implicit 
assumption as to the centrality of the worker’s consent to the direction 
by the employer, Tosafot then proceeds to lay down two alternative 
sub-scenarios in which the recourse controversy could arise33. The 
first sub-scenario is that of a worker, who agrees to be paid by the 
paymaster, so as to indicate his reliance on the paymaster’s 
undertaking to pay34, without expressly specifying to the employer 
whether the employer is thereby released, and if so, under what 
conditions, namely whether the release, if any, is absolute or 
conditional. The second alternative sub scenario laid down by Tosafot 
is that of an express renunciation by the worker of his recourse against 
the employer, on the condition of payment made by the paymaster. 
The first sub-scenario is that of renunciation implied from the 
reliance on the paymaster. In discussing it, Tosafot is cognizant of the 
general rule that applies in the absence of a deposit or loan owed to 
the instruction giver by the one who is instructed to pay to a 
designated payee. Then, the one who is instructed to pay may revoke 
his promise to pay the payee designated in the instruction; this is so 
even when such promise was given in the presence of all three35. True, 
Tosafot concedes, this revocability rule appears to apply to the 
promise of the paymaster (the one who is instructed to pay) who, 
having agreed to pay the creditor-payee/worker, is to extend credit to 
the debtor-employer/instruction giver; nevertheless, in the context of 
the first sub-scenario, and without necessarily limiting our scenario 
                                                       
33 A third sub-scenario, under which the recourse does not relate to the underlying 
debt owed to the worker, but rather to the remedy for the violation of the prohibition 
against delaying payment, is not relevant to the present discussion and is thus not 
elaborated here. 
34 In fact, it is not all that clear as to whether in this sub-scenario the worker is to 
expressly advise the employer of his exclusive reliance on the paymaster. In my view, 
TOSAFOT’S analysis of this scenario also applies to the case in which the worker 
agreed to go to the paymaster without specifically stating that he relies on to the 
paymaster.  
35 Talmud, Gitin, p.13B.  
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only to circumstances wherein all three are present in one location36, 
Tosafot rejects the application of this revocability rule. Rather, in 
Tosafot’s view, an absolute release of the employer by the worker is 
possible in the context of the first sub-scenario when the paymaster 
assumes, towards the worker, a binding and irrevocable obligation, 
guarantying that of the employer; at that point, the paymaster is taken 
to advise the worker to rely entirely on him and release the employer. 
It is on the basis of this guarantee that the worker’s statement, 
expressly made to the employer as to the worker’s own reliance on the 
paymaster, is taken to implicitly renounce the worker’s recourse right 
against the employer.  
Tosafot is however unclear as to the language required to generate 
an implied paymaster’s guarantee. Rather, he uses a word37 that could 
mean either that the paymaster caused the worker to be next or close 
to him, or that the paymaster caused the worker to rely upon him. 
Having so caused the worker, the paymaster became “as if saying” to 
the worker “rely on me and release the employer”.  
Both the binding effect of an oral guarantee, unsupported by an act 
of kinyan, and the absolute discharge it may confer to the employer, 
are derived from discussions elsewhere in the Talmud38. First, the 
Talmud considers the satisfaction derived by the guarantor from 
seeing he is deemed by the creditor trustworthy as adequate to 
produce the guarantor’s binding commitment39. 
                                                       
36 This is so since TOSAFOT specifically speaks of the revocability or the paymaster’s 
promise even (and not only) when given in the presence of all three. 
37 In Hebrew, in English transliteration, ‘his-mi-cho’.  
38 Talmud, Bava Batra, p.173A-174A. 
39  See statement by Rav Ashi in Talmud, Bava Batra, p.173B. This however falls 
short of rationalizing the effectiveness of an implied (as opposed to express) 
guarantee, as undertaken by the paymaster in our case. In any event, no similar 
satisfaction can be derived where the debtor already owes the guarantied sum to the 
creditor, such as when, notwithstanding ALBECK, The Assignment of Debt in the 
Talmud, supra n.13, as discussed in n.13, n.21 and n.23, the paymaster owed the sum 
to the employer.  The satisfaction derived by the paymaster in our scenario is 
discussed in the paragraph that follows the next one. For the impact of satisfaction as 
a mode of either acquisition or binding obligation see Y.FRIEDMAN, Satisfaction and 
Property in the Talmud (1972-5732), 3 Deinney Yisrael 115 [in Hebrew]. For the 
binding effect of a guarantee on the basis of satisfaction, in light of the apparent no 
binding effect for a bare promise, see comprehensive discussion by LIFSHITZ, 
Promise: Obligation and Acquisition in Jewish Law, supra n.31, p.1-117 (Chapter 1 
dealing with promise) and p.187-279 (Chapter 3 dealing with the guarantee).  
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Second, an ordinary guarantor is secondarily liable; he is 
answerable to the creditor only where the creditor is unable to collect 
from the principal debtor. To that end, the giving of the guarantee 
does not usually release the principal debtor from his primary 
liability; yet, there are exceptions to this rule.40 The one exception in 
which the debtor is completely discharged41 is where the guarantor 
physically took the money from the lender and passed it on to the 
debtor; in such a case, the guarantor is regarded as the principal 
debtor, and the borrower receives an absolute discharge; in fact, he 
has never been even liable to the lender, but rather only to the 
guarantor42. Presumably43, what Tosafot is to be taken to mean, is that 
in our case, the paymaster is to be regarded as if he took money from 
the worker in order to pass it on to the employer who had never been 
liable directly to the worker44. The paymaster’s obligation is then 
                                                       
40 Talmud, Bava Batra, p.173A-174A. 
41 Other exceptions affect the sequence of recovery, namely, cover circumstances in 
which the creditor may or is to recover first from the guarantor, rather than from the 
debtor, who nevertheless remains liable.  
42 The five categories into which a guarantee may fall are explained by TOSAFOT in 
Talmud, Bava Batra, p.173B. The category under which the guarantor becomes a 
primary debtor and the principal (original) debtor is fully discharged is that of a ‘no-
sé ve-noten ba-yad’, literally translated as “carries [the money from the lender] and 
gives [it] by hand [to the borrower]”. For a more detailed definition of ‘no-sé ve-
noten ba-yad’ see B.KAHANA, Guarantee, Jerusalem1991, p.95-101 [in Hebrew]. 
TOSAFOT points out that even in such a case, the borrower-principal debtor, who 
remains liable to the guarantor (who is liable to the lender-creditor), may find himself 
liable directly to the lender-creditor, though only in circumstances under which the 
guarantor cannot pay the lender-creditor; this could happen under what is known as 
“Rabbi Nathan’s lien” (see e.g. Talmud, Kiddushin, p.15A). That lien applies where 
A owes to B who owes to C, in which case, C may recover directly from A, but only 
where he (C) cannot collect from B. Yet, this is a matter of enforcement by C 
(creditor-worker) of the debt owed to him by B (the paymaster-guarantor) by 
resorting to the security of the debt owed by A (the employer-principal debtor) to B 
(the paymaster-guarantor); by itself this is not a matter of A (the employer-principal 
debtor) being directly liable to C (the creditor-worker). 
43 That point, namely, the basis for the primary nature of the paymaster’s guarantee 
undertaking, has not been discussed by commentators. 
44 The position of a guarantor who, for all intents and purposes, replaces the debtor 
who was originally liable, is in fact addressed by the sources, but only in the case of a 
guarantee by a Jew for a loan taken from a non-Jew on which interest (which is 
forbidden for a debt owed by one Jew to another) is payable by the Jewish borrower. 
Such a guarantor is called ‘shlof-dotz’. See KAHANA, Guarantee, supra n.42, p.92-93. 
For the origins of the expression see RASHI in Talmud, Yevamot 109B D”H Shalzion. 
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primary, and not secondary or dependent on a co-extensive principal 
obligation of the employer45. 
In effect, the dispensation with an act of kinyan to support the 
irrevocability of the guarantee obligation appears to be consistent with 
the absolute discharge of the employer in the particular case of a 
guarantee given by the paymaster. Thus, in the usual case of a 
guarantee given for a loan, the binding effect of the guarantee is on 
the basis of the guarantor’s satisfaction derived from the reliance on 
him, so as to dispense with the kinyan requirement46. On its own terms 
this rationale is limited to circumstances where the guarantee was 
given prior to the disbursement of funds to the borrower by the 
lender;47 in such a case, the disbursement of funds is the act done in 
reliance on the guarantee, which thus gives the guarantor the required 
satisfaction. In contrast, when the guarantee is given after the loan 
was disbursed, it cannot be said that the giving of the loan was on the 
basis of the guarantee, so as to give the guarantor the required 
satisfaction.  
The broad principle is then that for a guarantee to bind without an 
act of kinyan, the guarantor is to derive satisfaction from ‘something’ 
done, or omitted to be done, by the creditor, in reliance on the 
guarantee. In our scenario, the debtor-employer is to be seen as 
already owing the debt to the creditor-worker; he also risks violation 
against the prohibition against delaying wages to the worker; hence, 
there is no satisfaction derived by the guarantor-paymaster, other than 
from seeing that on the basis of his guarantee, the worker-creditor is 
releasing the debtor-employer who is consequently positioned not to 
violate the prohibition against delaying payment.48 To that end, the 
                                                       
45 Which is the case for an ordinary guarantee. See Talmud, Bava Batra at 173B and 
TOSAFOT, supra n.42. However, primary obligation is not necessary autonomous, 
namely free of defences available to the employer against the worker; it does not 
follow from the primary nature of the paymaster’s obligation that the paymaster is 
liable even if the worker has not performed under his contract of employment. Stated 
otherwise, it may nevertheless be an obligation to pay against the worker’s 
performance to the employer. 
46 Supra n.39, per Rav Ashi. 
47 Talmud, Bava Batra, p.176B. 
48 Even where the guarantee is given prior to the tasks to be performed by the worker 
under his contract of employment with the employer, as speculated below in §2.e in 
text around n.81, it may be far fetched to suppose that as a general rule the worker 
(creditor) agreed to work for the employer (debtor) only in reliance of the 
paymaster’s guarantee, so as to give the paymaster the required satisfaction. 
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absolute discharge of, or loss of recourse against, the employer by the 
worker, is the ‘something’ happening on the basis of the paymaster’s 
guarantee, so as to give him the satisfaction which dispenses the act of 
kinyan49. 
As recalled, the disputation between Rav Shesheth and Rabbah is 
on the continued liability of the employer. According to Rav 
Shesheth, no recourse is available so that the employer is released. 
Conversely, in Rabbah’s view, recourse is available so that the 
employer remains liable. The first alternative sub-scenario involves an 
implied absolute renunciation on the basis of the assumption of a 
guarantor’s liability by the paymaster. In this context, the disputation 
is as to whether, upon the default in payment of the paymaster, 
recourse against the employer is available to the worker, who did not 
specifically attach any condition to his agreement to be paid by the 
paymaster. Rav Shesheth appears to endorse both the guarantee’s 
undertaking of the paymaster and its falling into the category under 
which the primary debtor (the employer) receives an absolute 
discharge; he further seems to be of the view that the worker’s 
implied renunciation is fully effective. Conversely, it is not all that 
obvious from Tosafot whether Rabbah‘s view is premised on a 
rejection of the guarantee’s theory, disapproval of the treatment of the 
guarantee as falling into the category under which the principal debtor 
is discharged, or else, on deeming an implied renunciation as 
inadequate to generate a discharge.  
As further indicated50, the second alternative sub-scenario laid 
down by Tosafot is that of an express renunciation by the worker of 
his recourse against the employer, on the condition of payment made 
                                                       
49 Granted, any impact on the worker’s recourse from the employer on the basis of the 
paymaster’s guarantee, even short of total loss of recourse, would have given the 
guarantor-paymaster the required satisfaction. For example, conditional discharge, 
effectively reversing the sequence of liability, so as to allow or require the creditor-
worker to first attempt to recover from the guarantor-paymaster, and to pursue 
recovery from the debtor-employer only upon the default by the paymaster, would 
have allowed the guarantor-paymaster to derive satisfaction. Hence, dispensation of 
kinyan on the basis of derived satisfaction explains why in our scenario the 
paymaster’s undertaking is not an ordinary guarantee, in which the guarantor is 
secondary liable; yet it does not explain why in our scenario this is necessarily a 
guarantee of the type in which the debtor is absolutely discharged and the guarantor 
becomes the sole debtor. The point is not discussed by commentators and will not be 
further addressed here.  
50 Above, text that follows n.34.  
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by the paymaster. Contrary to the renunciation under the first 
alternative sub-scenario, which is absolute but implied, renunciation 
under the second alternative sub-scenario is conditional yet express. 
Thereunder, the worker reserves the recourse right against the 
employer in the case of default or non-payment by the paymaster. 
Also, unlike in the case of the first sub-scenario, which involves the 
guarantee undertaking of the paymaster, nothing is stated in the 
context of the second sub-scenario, on the existence or absence of an 
undertaking by the paymaster.  
As pointed out, other than expressly adding the reservation of the 
right to go after the employer upon the default by the paymaster, the 
second sub-scenario is very much like the second ‘obvious’ setting of 
Tosafot, that of an express renunciation, conditional upon payment by 
the paymaster. In that latter setting Tosafot pointed out that it is 
obvious that on its own stated terms recourse is available to the 
worker against the employer upon the default in payment by the 
paymaster51. This observation appears to be fully applicable to the 
second alternative sub-scenario, so that in its context there is no 
disputation on this point; rather, in Tosafot’s view, in the context of 
the second alternative sub-scenario, the disputation between Rav 
Shesheth and Rabbah is whether recourse from the employer is 
available to the worker even in the absence of default by the 
paymaster.  
In effect, the disputation is then as to whether conditional release 
or discharge works; according to Rav Shesheth, conditional discharge 
is effective so that no recourse is available to the worker against the 
employer, as long as the paymaster has not defaulted. Conversely, 
Rabbah’s view appears to be that recourse is available 
notwithstanding the conditional release. Stated otherwise, Rabbah’s 
position is that conditional release does not work, so that the employer 
remains liable notwithstanding the worker’s agreement to be directed 
to the paymaster, in which case recourse against the employer is 
available to the worker throughout, namely also before, and not only 
after, the paymaster’s default.  
No explanation is immediately discernible from the discussion by 
Tosafot to highlight the different conclusions of the sages as applied 
to the second sub-scenario. Both are stated to agree that an oral 
                                                       
51 Ibid. 
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explicit renunciation is effective on its own terms; certainly, Rav 
Shesheth’s view is premised on this position. What is unclear then is 
on what grounds Rabbah does not apply this principle in the context 
of the second sub-scenario. 
c. Other Commentators - Elaborating Tosafot’s Discussion 
Having accepted the premise of a scenario dealing with the 
extension of credit by the paymaster to the employer, commentators 
focus on the availability of recourse by the worker from the employer 
in the context of the two sub-scenarios of Tosafot. Overall, their 
discussion is on three levels. First, it endeavours to fill in blanks in 
Tosafot’s analysis. Second, the discussion purports to determine 
which is actually the sub-scenario discussed in the Gemara, namely 
whether it is of an implied absolute discharge or express conditional 
discharge. Third and last, commentators aim to rule as to which of the 
two sages’ positions regarding the availability to the worker of 
recourse from the employer, is to prevail. As recalled, recourse is to 
be precluded according to Rav Shesheth and available according to 
Rabbah.  
In connection with the first sub-scenario (an implied absolute 
discharge based on reliance on the paymaster’s undertaking), Nimukei 
Yoseph52 explains the binding effect or irrevocability of the implied 
guarantee liability of the storekeeper or moneychanger as premised on 
the nature of his calling. Stated otherwise, the storekeeper, as a trader, 
or the moneychanger, who deals with money, are to be taken to be 
unable to revoke their undertaking, and be bound by it, even in the 
absence of a loan or deposit owed by either of them to the employer. 
In the view of Nimukei Yoseph, both Rav Shesheth and Rabbah are to 
be taken to be in agreement on that premise, that of the binding effect, 
or irrevocability, of the payment obligation of the paymaster to the 
worker.  
Nimukei Yoseph does not discuss the possibility of a disagreement 
between Rav Shesheth and Rabbah as to the nature of the guarantee 
undertaken by the paymaster, that is whether the guarantee is an 
ordinary one, under which the employer is not discharged53, or of the 
                                                       
52 N.YOSEPH, D”H Chozer, commenting on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.68A (of Rif’s 
page numbering). 
53 Yet to allow recovery first from the guarantor-paymaster and only then from the 
employer-debtor, the guarantee ought to be of the type ‘arev-kablan’. See TOSAFOT in 
Talmud Bava Batra, p.73B, discussed supra in n.42. Cf. RASHI in Bava Metzia, p.62A 
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category under which the guarantor is fully discharged. The former 
classification would have supported Rabbah’s view that recourse is 
available, while the latter classification would have supported Rav 
Shesheth’s opinion that recourse is not available. Rather, according to 
Nimukei Yoseph, the disputation evolves around the effectiveness of 
an oral implied renunciation in reliance of the paymaster’s irrevocable 
guaranty obligation. Thus, Rav Shesheth is of the view that a 
renunciation implied from the worker’s explicit reliance on the 
paymaster is fully effective so as to discharge the employer. 
Conversely, Rabbah is of the opinion that to be effective to release the 
employer, even in such circumstances, an express renunciation ought 
to have been made by the worker.  
It is however unclear whether according to Nimukei Yoseph the 
two sages disagree on the adequacy of an implied renunciation in 
general, or on to the facts of the case. To the latter end, Rav Shesheth 
may be of the view that once there is a guarantee of the category 
under which the borrower is not liable, no recourse against him is 
available, and hence, no express renunciation of such recourse may be 
needed; renunciation may simply be implied from the nature of the 
guarantee relied upon. Conversely, Rabbah may be taken to draw a 
distinction between two situations in which a guarantor becomes the 
primary debtor. On one hand, there is the usual case of a borrower 
who received the lender’s money through the guarantor, and who has 
never been liable, so that no recourse has ever been available against 
him. On the other hand, there is the case of the employer who was 
liable to the worker in the first place, and who allegedly becomes 
discharged due to the creditor’s reliance on the guarantee making the 
guarantor the primary debtor. According to Rabbah then, while an 
express renunciation is not needed in the former case, it is certainly 
required in the latter.  
Other commentators focus on the second sub-scenario (an explicit 
conditional discharge of the employer by the worker, attached to the 
worker’s agreement to be paid by the paymaster). In this context, an 
express condition is attached to the worker’s agreement to be paid by 
the paymaster; that condition, suspends the employer’s obligation 
                                                                                                                     
D”H Detanan, speaking of a guarantor who is an intermediary between the lender and 
the borrower, namely a guarantor who is liable directly and unconditionally to the 
lender and is entitled to recover from the borrower. 
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until default of the paymaster. Right to recourse upon default is 
however explicitly reserved. Commentators’ remarks mostly 
endeavour to rationalize Rabbah’s position, effectively invalidating 
this condition, by stating that notwithstanding such an express 
condition, recourse from the employer is available to the worker 
throughout, that is, even in the absence of, or prior to, default by the 
paymaster. In other words, the employer had not been discharged, 
even temporarily, and remained liable to the worker, irrespective of 
the qualified or conditional renunciation expressed by the worker.  
A common explanation given to Rabbah’s position, denying 
efficacy to the release of the employer by the worker until default by 
the paymaster, is premised on the revocability of the payment 
obligation of the paymaster. According to the Rosh, the conditional 
release given to the employer by the worker must be taken to be 
mistaken, and thus not binding, since the payment obligation of the 
paymaster is revocable54. The Mordechai strengthens the mistaken 
release theory, by adding that the worker is aware of the employer’s 
power to countermand payment, that is, to revoke the authority given 
to the paymaster to pay, and thus cannot be taken to release the 
employer, lest no one will remain liable to pay to him his wages55. In 
connection with the second sub-scenario, Rav Shesheth, denying 
recourse, is taken to accept, at face value, the validity of the 
employer’s release by the worker until default by the paymaster.  
It is possible to view the analysis of first sub-scenario (an implied 
renunciation on the basis of a guarantee) as premised on the 
irrevocability of the paymaster’s obligation, with Rav Shesheth and 
Rabbah disagreeing on the effect of an implied renunciation derived 
from the reliance on that obligation. Conversely, in the context of the 
second sub-scenario (an express discharge of the employer’s 
obligation until default by the paymaster), Rabbah’s position, 
invalidating the conditional discharge given by the worker to the 
employer, is premised on the revocability of the paymaster’s 
obligation. At the same time, in connection with the second sub-
scenario, Rav Shesheth’s position, validating the express conditional 
discharge, is consistent with both premises, that of revocability and 
irrevocability of the paymaster’s obligation, or in fact, where there is 
                                                       
54 ROSH, D”H Ibaei lehu, commenting on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A.  
55 MORDECHAI, D”H Himchahu, commenting on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A. 
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no obligation altogether on the part of the paymaster. In other words, 
if release of the employer is effective even when the substituting 
promise of paymaster is revocable, release ought also to work in the 
comparable case of absence of a commitment; furthermore, it is 
obvious that release ought to be effective in the easier case in which 
the substituting promise is irrevocable.  
Not all aspects of the discrepancy between the two Tosafot’s sub-
scenarios, as subsequently analyzed by commentators, are entirely 
obvious. Indeed, per Tosafot, in the first sub-scenario, renunciation is 
absolute though implied; in the second sub-scenario it is conditional 
yet express. This indeed is an obvious factual discrepancy. However, 
per Tosafot, in the first sub-scenario, the paymaster’s undertaking is 
in the form of an implied guarantee; at the same time, neither the 
existence of a paymaster’s undertaking, nor its absence, is stated in 
the second sub-scenario56. On their part, commentators57 strictly 
followed Tosafot as to the renunciation point; yet, in preferring 
Rabbah’s position to that of Rav Shesheth as to the availability of 
recourse in the second sub-scenario, commentators discussed the 
irrevocability of the paymaster’s undertaking; thereby, they filled in a 
blank in Tosafot’s second sub-scenario, by adding an undertaking 
given by the paymaster. 
In the context of the second sub-scenario, that of an express 
conditional discharge, commentators thus agree with Rabbah that in 
the absence of a paymaster’s binding undertaking, recourse is 
available to the worker against the employer. Unfortunately, it is not 
obvious if they are to be taken to reject the possibility of an implied 
irrevocable guarantee by the paymaster, on which Rav Shesheth and 
Rabbah appear to agree in the context of the first sub-scenario58; in 
such a case, there is a discrepancy in the legal analysis of the two sub-
scenarios. Alternatively, having accepted in principle the possibility 
of an implied irrevocable guarantee given by the paymaster in the 
second sub-scenario, such commentators may be taken to assert that 
in the facts of the second sub-scenario, required language, or perhaps 
any other condition, for the guarantee, have not been met. If the latter, 
discrepancy on the point is merely factual; an implied irrevocable 
                                                       
56 Above, text that follows n.34. 
57 See e.g. ROSH, supra n.54 and N.YOSEPH, supra n.52. 
58 See text above around n.37.  
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guarantee is then said to exist in the first sub-scenario but not in the 
second one; in such a case, however, Tosafot’s absence of discussion 
on the language or circumstances required for the implied guarantee is 
mostly unfortunate, as there is no indication whatsoever as to the 
circumstances under which an implied guarantee will arise under the 
first sub-scenario, as opposed to an irrevocable undertaking under the 
second sub-scenario. 
Final ruling in Jewish law appears to treat the Bava Metzia 
narrative as relating to the second sub-scenario (an express 
conditional discharge pending default by the paymaster). As well, 
final ruling in Jewish law appears to side with Rabbah’s position as to 
the lack of validity of the conditional discharge, which allows the 
worker to have his recourse against the employer throughout, namely, 
even prior to and irrespective of default by the paymaster. The 
rationale given is that of the revocability of the paymaster’s 
obligation, such revocability being premised on the absence of any 
deposit or loan owed by the paymaster to the employer59. This may be 
taken to reject as a matter of law the binding effect of the implied 
guarantee also per the first sub-scenario, and thereby to harmonize the 
treatment of the two sub-scenarios, with both taken to be premised, as 
a matter of law, on the revocability of the paymaster’s obligation. 
d. Which Scenario? – Aspects of Tosafot’s Analysis Revisited  
The acceptance of Rabbah’s premise (recourse is available 
irrespective and prior to default) and reasoning (mistaken 
renunciation) in the context of the second sub-scenario (an express 
discharge conditional on payment by the paymaster) may appear to 
reopen Tosafot’s ruling on the two initial settings, in which the 
answer was supposed to be ‘obvious60’. The first setting was where 
the worker, in agreeing to be paid by the paymaster, explicitly 
released the employer, even in the case the paymaster would not pay. 
The second setting was that when the worker, in agreeing to be paid 
by the paymaster, explicitly made the release or discharge of the 
employer contingent or conditional on actual payment by the 
paymaster. In Tosafot’s view, it was ‘obvious’ that recourse was not 
available to the worker in the first setting, that of an express absolute 
                                                       
59 See TUR, Choshen Mishpat, Section 339 and SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat, 
Section 339.  
60 Above §2.b, particularly text around n.32. 
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release of the employer by the worker; it was equally ‘obvious’ that 
recourse was available, upon non-payment or default by the 
paymaster, in the second setting, that of an express conditional release 
of the employer by the worker. In both such cases, the existence or 
absence of recourse was made dependent on the express renunciation 
included in the worker’s agreement to be paid by the paymaster.  
Yet, at first blush, if the paymaster’s obligation is revocable so that 
the worker’s attempted expressly stated conditional release fails as a 
mistaken release, per Rabbah’s view in the context of the second sub-
scenario, it is hard to see why the express absolute discharge of the 
employer, per the first setting dismissed by Tosafot as ‘obvious’, will 
work better. Stated otherwise, arguably, discharge ought to be taken 
to be mistaken, and hence ineffective, not only when it is conditional 
(Rabbah’s view for the second sub-scenario) but also, and in fact 
more so, when it is absolute (Tosafot’s first ‘obvious’ setting); that is, 
if the obligation of the paymaster is revocable, an absolute discharge 
will leave the worker with no remedy whatsoever upon the revocation 
by the paymaster, as the worker may then be unable to go back and 
recover from the employer. The absolute discharge must then be seen 
as mistaken and invalid. Hence, the acceptance of Rabbah’s premise 
and reasoning in the context of the second sub-scenario may result in 
the reversal of the ‘obvious’ conclusion reached by Tosafot for the 
first initial setting presented by him.  
True, as suggested by Nimukei Yoseph61, Rabbah may still be seen 
as agreeing to the validity of an absolute discharge based on the 
irrevocable guarantee of the employer, but not to an absolute 
discharge purportedly given in the absence of such a binding 
undertaking. It is nevertheless possible to come up with an alternative 
explanation to Tosafot’s position under which it is only the 
renunciation in the second sub-scenario, but not in the first ‘obvious’ 
setting, which is mistaken and hence invalid. The key is Tosafot’s 
view as to the meaning of a mistaken renunciation, which emerges 
from another part of his same discussion on the Bava Metzia text, 
dealing with a related matter. Thus, in Tosafot’s view, to be effective, 
renunciation given as part of a compromise or settlement of a 
monetary dispute cannot be oral and requires an act of kinyan62; this is 
                                                       
61 Supra, n.52. 
62 See above text at n.28-31. 
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so, since the party who would have won in court would not have 
settled had he known he would have won. Stated otherwise, in 
Tosafot’s view, mistaken renunciation is not only one based on 
mistaken belief in the existence of a state of facts that actually does 
not exist, but also one based on risk taken as to contingent facts.  
On these grounds, it is only an oral conditional renunciation, as in 
the second sub-scenario, but not an absolute one, as in the first 
‘obvious’ setting, that can be viewed as mistaken; furthermore, per 
this reasoning, a conditional renunciation is inherently, by its nature, 
mistaken, since the existence of ‘conditions’ that may or may not be 
met gives rise to uncertainty, on which an oral renunciation cannot be 
based free of error. Arguably then, commentators who explain 
Rabbah’s position under the second sub-scenario as premised on the 
mistaken basis of the employer’s release by the worker adhere to 
Tosafot’s expanded understanding of ‘mistake’ as covering 
uncertainties due to contingencies63.  
There may also be an apparent contradiction between Rabbah’s 
position as to the second sub-scenario and Tosafot’s view as to the 
second ‘obvious’ setting. Thus, Rabbah’s position for the second sub-
scenario invalidates the worker’s explicit undertaking to discharge the 
employer until default in payment by the paymaster. Consequently, 
the worker’s recourse from the employer is not to commence upon the 
default in payment by the paymaster, as may be under Tosafot’s 
second initial ‘obvious’ setting. In that setting, the employer’s 
discharge is explicitly made by the worker contingent or conditional 
on actual payment by the paymaster. Rather, in Rabbah’s view with 
regard to the second sub-scenario, recourse from the employer is to be 
available to the worker throughout, irrespective of his agreement to be 
paid by the paymaster. Hence, the acceptance of Rabbah’s premise 
and reasoning for the second sub-scenario results in either the 
reversal, or the bypassing of the significance, of Tosafot’s ‘obvious’ 
conclusion as to the second initial setting; if the employer is not 
discharged prior to the default by the paymaster, there is no 
                                                       
63 For such commentators see above, text and n.54-55. Compare and contrast with 
Bava Metzia, p.66B-67A, discussing the avoidance of an obligation incurred on the 
basis of either mistaken renunciation, or in the belief that a stated condition thereto 
will not be fulfilled, in which context ‘mistake’ is more conventionally understood to 
refer to the mistaken belief in the existence of a state of fasts (or law) that actually 
doe not exist. 
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employer’s liability to be incurred upon the default by the paymaster. 
Stated otherwise, if the express discharge of the employer until 
default by the paymaster is ineffective so that the employer remains 
liable throughout, per Rabbah’s position for the second sub-scenario, 
liability of the employer cannot be seen as triggered by the default by 
the paymaster, as may Tosafot’s ‘obvious’ conclusion for the second 
initial setting be understood to state.  
In the final analysis however, Tosafot’s conclusions for both the 
second ‘obvious’ setting and the second sub-scenario are reconcilable; 
both involve the same stipulation by the worker, namely that of 
conditional renunciation upon payment; what is added in the second 
sub-scenario, namely, an express reservation of recourse upon non-
payment, is in fact a double stipulation,64 which ought to be taken as 
implied also in the second ‘obvious’ setting. For the second obvious 
setting, Tosafot is to be taken to say only that is clear that per the 
language expressing the renunciation, recourse is available upon non-
payment; Tosafot is not to be taken as implying anything then on the 
availability of recourse prior to that, a point which he subsequently 
discussed in the context of the second sub-scenario, on which the 
views of Rabbah and Rav Shesheth vary. 
e. Talmudic Text in Shevuot - Tosafot’s Position Supported 
Support to Tosafot’s position as to the centrality of the 
renunciation issue and insight on whether the Bava Metzia narrative 
requires the presence of all three65 may be derived by comparison to 
another Talmudic text, in Shevuot66. The situation dealt with there is 
that of a charge in the books or ledger of a storekeeper arising from a 
payment or sale made in alleged compliance by the storekeeper with 
an instruction given by a person; such an instruction was to provide 
wheat to the instruction giver’s son or small-value coins to his worker. 
The Mishna discusses a case in which the worker and the storekeeper 
disagree as to whether the storekeeper complied. It rules that 
whenever the worker denies receipt of payment claimed to be made 
                                                       
64 A double stipulation states both the positive and negative side of an obligation; it is 
a condition stating both what will happen upon its compliance and upon its breach. 
See Talmud, Kidduhsin, p.61A. 
65 A question left open in text around n.20 above. For the renunciation of recourse as 
central to Tosafot’s position see §2.b above. 
66 Talmud, Shevuot, p.45A, and Jerusalem Talmud, Shevuot, p.36B, discussed 
immediately below. 
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by the storekeeper, the employer is to pay to both, that is, to the 
storekeeper and the worker67. This continued liability of the employer 
means the availability of recourse to the worker against him.  
Two points ought to be highlighted. First, the text in Shevuot does 
not raise the issue of recourse by the worker against the employer; it 
appears to take its existence for granted. Second, the Bava Metzia 
narrative does not even refer to the Shevuot text; yet, it could have 
been expected that Rabbah would rely on the Shevuot discussion as 
supporting the availability of recourse and that Rav Shesheth would 
endeavour to distinguish it so as to justify lack of recourse according 
to his own analysis. It seems then that it was obvious to all concerned 
that the two Talmudic texts do not deal with the same scenario; 
indeed, in the Bava Metzia text the direction given by the employer is 
addressed to the worker, namely to the creditor, to go and recover 
from the paymaster. Conversely, in Shevuot, the direction is given by 
the employer to the paymaster, to pay to the worker. And while either 
way a double direction from the employer is required, the one to the 
worker to go and get paid, and the other to the paymaster to pay, the 
emphasis in each scenario on one direction is not without 
implications. 
Thus, the issue of renunciation, with which Tosafot’s analysis to 
the Bava Metzia narrative is concerned, is a matter coming up 
between the employer and the worker; it arises in a scenario involving 
them both, as when the employer directs the worker to go to the 
paymaster. At the same time, no renunciation comes up in that part of 
the scenario in which the worker is not involved, that of the direction 
given by the employer to the paymaster, as in Shevuot. By itself, the 
direction dealt with in Shevuot neither entitles nor binds the worker, 
                                                       
67 For this interpretation see PNEI MOSHE commentary to the Jerusalem Talmud, 
Shevout (Talmud p.36B) and to a similar end, in the Talmud, Kiddushin, p.43B. There 
is a disputation in the Mishna in Shevuot (p.45A in the Bavli Talmud; p.36B in the 
Jerusalem Talmud), irrelevant for our purposes, as to whether to be successful in their 
claims against the employer, both the worker and the storekeeper need take an oath. 
As well, note that the Talmudic discussion in Shevuot equally covers the father and 
son scenario, and not only that of the employer and worker, to which attention is 
restricted in the present discussion. Yet, it will be noted that the initial entitlement of 
the son from the father, unlike that of the worker from the employer, is not all that 
obvious. Arguably, the father and son case is relevant only to the oath taking aspect 
of the text, and is not to be taken as implying father’s liability to his son. See 
TOSAFOT YOM TOV, D”H Ten livni, commenting on Mishna, Shevuot, Section 7, Rule 
5. 
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who thus remains entitled to recover from the employer at any time. It 
is in fact the absence of any modification in the worker’s rights on 
which the Shevuot text focuses. Conversely, in the Bava Metzia text, it 
is the worker’s consent, to abide to the employer’s direction, which is 
determinative; hence, it is only then that the issue of the modification 
of his rights, in the form of renunciation or loss of recourse, arises.  
Indeed, in the Jerusalem Talmud, the Gemara in Shevuot limits the 
case dealt with by the Mishna, that of the direction addressed to the 
storekeeper, to a situation where the instruction is not given in the 
presence of all three. It is only then, that is, when the worker is not 
even present at the time the instruction is given by the employer to the 
storekeeper, that the employer remains liable to the worker. 
Conversely, where all three are present at the time the instruction is 
given, that is, when the worker has been present, the Gemara in the 
Jerusalem Talmud categorically states, the employer has been 
discharged and recourse is available to the worker only against the 
storekeeper68. 
Obviously then, in holding that the storekeeper is liable and cannot 
renege69, the Gemara in the Jerusalem Talmud envisages a case in 
which the storekeeper undertook to pay. The Ridvaz takes the position 
that in such a case it is “as if” the storekeeper owed money to the 
employer who had paid him in advance; yet in fact, no advance had 
actually been made and even without a debt owed by the storekeeper 
to the employer, the employer is discharged, and the storekeeper may 
not renege.  Mareh Hapanim is of the same opinion; in his view  the 
case, dealt with by the Jerusalem Talmud is one in which  the 
storekeeper extends credit to the employer, which is the same as in the 
Bava Metzia text. In the view of Mareh Hapanim, the Gemara in the 
Jerusalem Talmud thus appears to follow Rav Shesheth, who in his 
                                                       
68 Talmud, Shevuot, p.36B-37A. The Gemara text distinguishes between a situation in 
which the employer “did not make the worker stand [before the storekeeper] with 
him”, namely with the employer, in which case there is recourse, and the situation in 
which the employer “made the worker stand [before the storekeeper] with him”, 
namely the employer, in which case there is no recourse. PNEI MOSHE and RIDVAZ on 
the Gemara page are more explicit in characterizing the latter situation, in which 
recourse is lost, as involving the presence of all three.   
69 As PNEI MOSHE explains the Gemara text in the Jerusalem Talmud, in such a case, 
the risk falls on the storekeeper, who cannot get away by directing the workers to the 
employer who had been released, regardless of whether payment by the storekeeper is 
disputed or not made. 
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controversy with Rabbah in Bava Metiza precludes recourse against 
the employer; yet, per Mareh Hapanim, ultimately, “the law is not 
according to him”, but rather, according to Rabbah, who permits 
recourse against the employer.  
It thus emerges that in the footsteps of the Bava Metzia scenario, 
the Shevout Gemara in the Jerusalem Talmud deals with a case in 
which credit is extended by the paymaster/storekeeper to the 
employer. Indeed, in fastening liability on the storekeeper and 
discharging the employer, the Shevout Gemara in the Jerusalem 
Talmud may well be at variance with “the law” as subsequently 
prevailed; what matters to us however is that in distinguishing itself 
from the Shevout Mishna the Shevout Gemara in the Jerusalem 
Talmud contrasts that Mishna with the Bava Metzia scenario, by 
envisaging the latter to apply where all three are present together. 
Among the early commentators, both Rif70 and the Rosh71 are quite 
explicit in relying on the Shevuot Gemara in the Jerusalem Talmud as 
the basis for their own respective treatment of Rav Shesheth’s 
position on the loss of recourse in the Bava Metzia’s narrative, and 
viewing that position as confined to a situation where all three are 
present72. In the Rosh’s view, this position is further limited 
specifically to the first of Tosafot’s sub-scenarios, that of the implicit 
renunciation by the worker based on the paymaster’s the guarantee. 
Tosafot’s commentary to the Bava Metiza text is more ambiguous73; 
in dealing with that first sub-scenario, he mentions the revocation 
power of the paymaster who does not owe anything to the employer 
and states it to exist “even in the presence of all three”; he later on 
mentions the Jerusalem Talmud Gemara in Shevuot to refute the 
possibility that the Bava Metzia text, instead of dealing with a 
recourse against the employer, is actually concerned with a third sub-
scenario, that of the reinstatement of the worker’s remedy for the 
violation of the prohibition against delaying payment74.  
                                                       
70 RIF on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.68B (of RIF’S page numbering).  
71 ROSH, supra n.54. 
72 For Rav Shesheth’s position and a preliminary discussion on whether the Bava 
Metzia narrative is confined to a case where all three are present together see above 
§2.a. 
73 TOSAFOT, D”H Chozer, commenting on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A.  
74 For the third sub-scenario, see supra n.33. 
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Among the later commentators, Kessef Mishna treats the 
disputation in the Bava Metzia text as relating to whether, in order to 
be effective, the worker’s renunciation in the presence of all three 
must be express75. This excludes the second sub-scenario of Tosafot, 
that of an express conditional discharge; rather, this treatment must be 
taken as limiting the disputation in the Bava Metzia text to the case of 
the first Tosafot sub-scenario, that of the implicit renunciation on the 
basis of the paymaster’s guarantee. It also points out at the Bava 
Metzia text as further restricted to the situation that all three are 
present.  
Certainly, speaking of the direction given to the paymaster to pay 
the worker, the text of the Mishna in Shevuot ought to be taken as not 
purporting to affect the worker’s own rights; he is to obtain payment 
of money and not a payment obligation from the paymaster, and is to 
remain to be entitled to obtain payment in money solely from the 
employer. Neither the accrual of a right against the paymaster nor the 
loss of a right against the employer is to take place, and hence there is 
no need for the presence of all three, or in fact, of any mechanism, to 
create rights and duties.  
At the same time, speaking of the direction given to the worker by 
the employer to be paid by the paymaster, the Bava Metzia text ought 
to be taken as positioning the worker as dealing with both the 
employer and the paymaster. It is on the basis of what the paymaster 
tells the worker that the worker is purporting to renounce the recourse 
against the employer. This is particularly obvious in the first sub-
scenario (an implied absolute discharge based on reliance on the 
paymaster’s undertaking), in which renunciation is on the basis of the 
paymaster’s guarantee to the worker. Strictly speaking, in the second 
sub-scenario of Tosafot (express conditional discharge), 
communication is a matter exclusively between the employer and the 
worker76; hence, there is no pressing need to see it as confined to the 
presence of all three scenario. Yet, as discussed, commentators treat 
also the second sub-scenario as involving an undertaking by the 
paymaster, albeit revocable77. Under this understanding, also the 
                                                       
75 RAMBAM, Kinyan: Hilchot Mechira, Section 6, Rule 8. On the renunciation in the 
various settings and sub-scenarios of the Bava Metzia text see above §2.a. 
76 See text above in §2.b that follows n.34 and n.50. 
77 See above §2.c, particularly around n.57. 
 ARE  CHEQUES  TRACEABLE  TO  THE  TALMUD  ? 55 
 
 
Revue Internationale des droits de l’Antiquité LIV (2007) 
second sub-scenario is to better be envisaged as involving the 
presence of all three together.  
Hence it is more plausible to see all three standing together; the 
alternative is awkward: the worker, having received the direction from 
the employer, is to go to the paymaster, and having received from him 
an undertaking to pay, is now to return to the employer and make the 
renunciation.  
Indeed, the view under which the loss of recourse in the Bava 
Metzia text is limited to circumstances where renunciation was made 
in the presence of all three, may explain the paucity in the discussion 
by commentators as to the mechanism under which instructions are to 
direct the paymaster to pay the worker; certainly, if all three are 
present, no issue arises as to formal writing requirements, flow of 
communication, authentication of instructions or identification of the 
worker.  
On the other hand, if all three are present, it is not all that obvious 
why the paymaster is not to pay promptly to the worker, but is rather 
to undertake a deferred payment obligation, to be carried out at some 
point in the future78. Indeed, a delay may be understood to occur in the 
case of a paymaster-storekeeper, who is to extend credit by selling 
provisions to the worker over time; it is less understandable in the 
case of the paymaster-moneychanger who is to pay money to the 
worker. This is particularly so if the paymaster is held bound by the 
prohibition against delaying payment, from which the employer has 
been released by virtue of the direction issued to the worker to obtain 
payment from the paymaster79. 
True, the Bava Metzia text may be taken to be limited to unusual 
circumstances, such as where the moneychanger does not have 
                                                       
78 Which was clearly the case in the scenario described in the Gemara in Shevuot in 
the Jerusalem Talmud, p.36B, supra n.66, in order to demonstrate a case in which the 
workers have no recourse against the employer.  
79 For the view that unless payment through the paymaster is agreed in advance, the 
requirement to comply with the rule prohibiting delaying payment passes from the 
employer to the paymaster see TOSEFTA on Talmud, Bava Metzia, Section 10, Rule 1. 
On the compliance by the paymaster see ALBEK, Assignment of Debt, supra n.13, 
p.276-277. His reasoning is valid even without accepting his position of the 
paymaster’s pre-existing indebtedness to the employer, discussed in supra n.21 and 
n.23 above. As recalled, the prohibition against delaying payment to the worker was 
the main concern of the Mishna in the Bava Metzia narrative. See above, beginning of 
§2.a. 
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enough cash at hand, at least of the desired small coins, or else, the 
entire meeting of all three occurs either late in the day, after of what 
we may call today normal business hours, or not in the paymaster’s 
place of business. This however may significantly reduce the 
relevance of the discussion to ordinary circumstances; unless of 
course moneychangers used to set a shop in the market but kept their 
money, at least in part, particularly other than small change, 
elsewhere, in which case customers with whom they transacted in the 
market had often to come later to that other location to obtain their 
money. 
Another option, still adhering to the presence of all three setting, is 
to treat the scenario as one in which the paymaster promptly pays the 
worker, though not in cash, but rather in the form of agreeing to hold 
with him an amount available to the worker, for full or partial 
withdrawals, on demand. Under this view, the paymaster’s agreement 
to hold the amount for the worker will serve as ‘payment’ in 
compliance with the rule prohibiting delaying payment. In such a 
case, the disputation between Rabbah and Rav Shesheth is on the 
recourse available to the worker against the employer, as long as 
actual payment in money has not been carried out. This may be a way 
to see the Bava Metzia scenario as not limited to unusual 
circumstances80.  
Perhaps a simpler explanation to the delay in anticipated payment 
by the paymaster, while still requiring all three to be present, is to 
treat the setting as one wherein the direction given to the worker by 
the employer to get paid by the paymaster is given prior the end of the 
working day, that is, prior the completion of the work, namely, before 
the entitlement to payment accrues. Actual payment is then to be 
made at the end of the day, upon the completion of work. Indeed, this 
may explain the delay in payment by the paymaster; yet, this would 
have made any undertaking of the paymaster conditional upon 
completion of the work by the worker, for which we have no 
indication in any of the texts or discussions81. 
                                                       
80 Nevertheless, under this view of the matter, attention ought to have been given to 
the position of the employer who in reliance on the paymaster’s agreement may have 
already paid him in whole or in part money to be kept for the worker; lack of a 
discussion on the point strongly weakens this explanation to the delay. 
81 The conditional order issue may further arise in connection with the view of the 
TOSEFTA, supra n.79, under which the prohibition against delaying payment is 
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Another possibility in the context of a rule requiring all three to be 
present, is to treat the scenario as referring to the case of a worker 
who completed his tasks in the course of the day, prior to its end, so 
that there is still time between then and the point of time, at the end of 
the day, in which the prohibition against delaying payment, will be 
violated. In such a case, the paymaster’s obligation may be given 
ahead of actual payment; in turn, actual payment is to take place 
however prior to the end of the day, before the prohibition against 
delaying payment is violated. While this fits the text, it is questionable 
whether this is such a typical case to draw so much attention. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a paymaster’s payment obligation 
prior to actual payment is also not easily explained if the presence of 
all three is dispensed with. Even if the worker is to go on his own to 
the paymaster to demand payment, so that presence of all three is not 
required, it is not clear why payment is not to be made on the spot, 
and why instead the paymaster’s undertaking to pay in the future 
arises. It could however be argued, though admittedly, quite 
tenuously, that such could be the case in one of a few situations. First, 
the case may fall into the second sub-scenario, as described by 
Tosafot and not as ‘revised’ by commentators, in which no 
undertaking is given by the paymaster. Second, in connection with the 
first sub-scenario, the situation may be that in which there is a 
standing obligation of the paymaster to pay to the employer’s workers 
sent to him, in which case it is as if the paymaster actually spoke to 
the worker advising him to rely on him, but in fact did not speak to 
him directly a all. Third, a similar standing obligation can be 
contemplated also by the commentators who read Tosafot’s second 
sub-scenario as involving an undertaking, albeit revocable, of the 
paymaster82. In each such a case the worker makes the renunciation, 
whose effectiveness and scope is the subject of the discussion, prior to 
coming to the paymaster.  
In the final analysis, the simplest explanation to the paymaster’s 
deferred payment obligation may however be that the worker is 
                                                                                                                     
violated by neither the employer nor the paymaster where payment through a 
paymaster is agreed in advance. In such a case, however, at the initial stage of the 
agreement, payment is instructed to be made conditional upon the completion of the 
work, unless both the worker and paymaster are to be re-directed at its completion. 
Texts do not discuss this ‘two-stage’ agreement followed by direction.   
82 See above §§2.b and 2.c. 
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content with the obligation of the paymaster to pay to him in the 
future and does not demand immediate payment to which he is 
entitled by virtue of the law prohibiting delay in the payment of 
wages. This explanation holds true whether or not the worker’s 
renunciation ought to be made in the presence of both the employer 
and the paymaster. Indeed, the Gemara is quite explicit in stating that 
the prohibition against delaying payment of wages is violated when 
delay occurs notwithstanding the worker’s demand83; that is, the clock 
is ticking as of the demand only, and delay in payment is not 
precluded if consented by the worker who foregoes the demand. The 
presence-of-all-three setting may then prevail only as it appears to 
better fit the transactional flow, and not because it gives a superior 
explanation to the paymaster’s deferred payment obligation. 
At the same time, for this explanation to be consistent with the role 
of the storekeeper or moneychanger as a paymaster and not surety, in 
line with the picture depicted by Rashi and adhered to throughout the 
entire analysis above84, an actual payment, albeit delayed, in either 
kind (by the storekeeper) or money (by the moneychanger), is to be 
envisioned. Reasons and the extent for this delay, as well as the time 
for the employer’s repayment to the paymaster, and any possible cost 
incurred by him in connection with the operation of the mechanism85 
are neither specified nor amenable to deduction from available 
materials.  
It seems that the Talmudic text primarily focused on the legal 
implications of the renunciation in the various situations; no adequate 
attention was given to the operation of the payment mechanism in 
connection with which the renunciation is given. Unfortunately, 
commentators have not addressed the time lag between the payment 
obligation and payment itself, which could have shed more light and 
provided greater understanding of the mechanism. Certainly however, 
both the delay in actual payment, and as already indicated in §2.a, the 
probable existence of a presence-of-all three requirement, reinforce 
the view of the scenario as dealing with the credit extension by a 
paymaster who does not owe money to the employer. 
                                                       
83 Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A. 
84 See §2.a, text in paragraph preceding the one containing n.13, above.  
85 Certainly, any such cost may not violate the prohibition to take interest mentioned 
in supra n.4. 
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3. Final Modern Lawyer’s Observations 
Under modern law, a conditional discharge is implicitly given by 
the payee-creditor (the worker) to the drawer-debtor (the employer), 
in effect, of the type rejected by Rabbah in the context of the second 
sub-scenario. Thus, under modern law, upon the taking the cheque, in 
temporarily renouncing, or in effect suspending his right of recourse 
against the drawer-creditor, the payee-creditor does not rely at all on 
any undertaking or even representation emanating from the drawee 
bank- paymaster86; rather, he exclusively counts on the contingent 
liability of the drawer-debtor. Upon the dishonour of the cheque by 
the drawee-paymaster, the drawer-debtor becomes liable on the 
cheque87, and alternatively, on the basic transaction88.  
With respect to the second sub-scenario, that of an express 
conditional discharge, modern law thus appears to be quite consistent 
with Rav Shesheth’s position; per Tosafot’s text, such is the case 
where no undertaking is given by the drawee-paymaster to the payee-
creditor-worker. With respect to the first sub-scenario, that of an 
implied absolute discharge, the irrevocable undertaking given by the 
paymaster is not treated in modern law as a guarantee. It is either in 
the form of a bank’s engagement on a certified or its own cheque, or 
in the form of a letter of credit. The better view under modern law is 
to see the former situation, that of the certification or the bank cheque, 
as typically giving rise to an absolute renunciation by the payee-
creditor (worker) of his recourse against his debtor (the employer), the 
drawer of the certified cheque or the remitter of the bank cheque89. 
This is in line with the position of Rav Shesheth under the first sub-
scenario90.  
                                                       
86 See for example in Canada, under the Bills of Exchange Act, RSC 1985 c.B-4, 
Section 126 (drawee is not liable on a bill unless he accepted it), as well as Section 
130 (no liability on a bill without a signature). A ‘cheque’ is a specie of a bill. See 
Section 165. 
87 Ibid. Section 129(a). For dishonour by non-payment see Section 94. Alternatively 
he also becomes liable on the debt or basic transaction for which the cheque was 
given. 
88 This is so since payment by cheque is presumed to be conditional. See Re Charge 
Card Services Ltd. [1988], 3 All ER 702, p.707 (CA).   
89  This is reflected e.g. in the US in UCC 3-414(c).  
90 Conversely, the issue of the letter of credit is typically treated as conditional 
payment, releasing the debtor only on the condition of payment by the paymaster, the 
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Modern law departs from Rav Shesheth’s position in several 
respects. First, it is obvious that no presence of all three is required; 
the debtor-employer directs the creditor- worker to be paid by the 
paymaster by either issuing his own cheque to the payee-worker, or 
delivering to him a bank cheque issued by the paymaster. In turn, the 
presentment of this instrument by the creditor-worker to the 
paymaster constitutes the debtor-employer’s direction to the 
paymaster to pay. Second, the scope of the renunciation is implied by 
law, rather than in fact. In any given case, the presumption of either 
conditional or absolute discharge can be rebutted; yet, the relevant 
presumption arises without pursuing actual language and conduct of 
parties. Third, payment by cheque is taken to occur at the time it was 
accepted even in conditional payment, and not at the time it is actually 
honoured91; the lag preceding actual payment does not pose any 
problem. Fourth, while credit extension by the paymaster to the 
creditor is quite conceivable, the typical situation, at least in which a 
cheque is issued, is where the debtor’s funds are held with the 
paymaster92. Fifth, a payment order must be written. It also must be 
unconditional93; the modern lawyer cannot easily live with the 
proposition that the paymaster’s payment obligation may depend on 
the performance of the underlying contract by the payee-creditor, 
which is one of the possible scenarios to explain the time lag between 
the payment obligation and actual payment. 
In conclusion, the mechanism discussed in the Bava Metzia 
Talmudic text involves neither writing nor funds on deposit. It 
involves a demand possibly made by the creditor on the paymaster 
only in the presence of the debtor, and leaves recourse to be 
continuously available to the debtor against the creditor. 
                                                                                                                     
issuer of the letter of credit. See WJ Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co 
[1972] 2 All ER 127, p.136; [1972] 2 QB 189, 209. 
91 As pointed out by MEGAW LJ in The Brimnes Tenax Steamship Co v. The Brimnes 
(Owners) [1974] 3 All ER 88, 111-112 (CA).   
92 The drawee bank’s contractual duty to pay is subject to the availability of either 
funds in the drawer-customer’s account, or of an overdraft facility to him or her. See 
Barclays Bank v. W.J. Simms 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 225 at p.238, [1980] QB 677 (Goff J.).  
93 This is true for the cheque (see e.g. in Canada BEA supra n.86, Section 165(1) in 
conjunction with Section 16(1)) and transfer order (see e.g. in the US UCC Section 
4A-103(a)(1)(i). Cf. the letter of credit, with regard to which documentary (and no 
other) conditions are to be specified. ICC UCP 600 for Documentary Credits (2007 
Revision) Articles 2 (definitions of ‘credit’ and ‘presentation’) and 4-5.  
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Notwithstanding the temptation to the contrary94, neither cheques nor 
a cheque system are proven to have been envisioned by the Talmud in 
connection with this mechanism. While the Bava Metzia Talmudic 
text and related commentaries may have foreseen interesting 
forthcoming issues, it is premature to treat these materials as 
discussing cheques or containing a nascent cheque law.  
                                                       
94 As set out in supra n.3. 
